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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff-Appellee,

:

v.

i

ROBERT P. HAGEN,

:

Defendant-Appellant.

Case No. 900095-CA

Category No. 2

:

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This appeal is from a conviction of distribution of a
controlled substance, a third degree felony, under Utah Code Ann.
§ 58-37-8(l)(a)(ii) (1990).
This Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal under
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1990).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW
The sole issue on appeal that requires consideration is
whether the trial court applied the proper burden of proof and
standard of proof in determining that defendant was not an Indian
for purposes of state jurisdiction.
Because this presents a question of law, a "correction
of error" standard of review applies.

City of Monticello v.

Christensen, 788 P.2d 513, 516 (Utah 1990); Provo City
Corporation v. Willden, 768 P.2d 455, 456 (Utah 1989).

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
Relevant text of statutory provisions pertinent to the
resolution of the issue presented on appeal is contained in the
body of this brief.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant, Robert P. Hagen, was charged with
distribution of a controlled substance, a third degree felony,
under Utah Code Ann- § 58-37-8 (1990) (R. 1).
Pursuant to a plea bargain, defendant pled guilty to
the charge (R. 33, 36-43) • Prior to sentencing, defendant filed
a motion to arrest judgment and to withdraw his guilty plea,
challenging the court's jurisdiction on the basis that he was an
Indian who had allegedly committed a crime in Indian country and
thus was subject to federal jurisdiction only (R. 53-58).

After

an evidentiary hearing, the court denied defendant's motion,
sentenced him to a term of zero to five years in the Utah State
Prison, and ordered him to pay various fines and restitution (R.
61, 63-64; T. 25-26).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The essential facts are not in dispute.

Defendant pled

guilty to distribution of marijuana, which occurred in Myton,
Utah.
At the evidentiary hearing on his motion to arrest
judgment and to withdraw his guilty plea, defendant presented the
following evidence in an effort to establish that he was an
Indian for purposes of avoiding state criminal jurisdiction:
that defendant had lived on Indian reservations all his life,
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(1)

attending their schools and using their hospitals (T. 4 ) ; (2)
that he had lived on the Uintah Indian Reservation for the past
six or seven years, attending some of the Ute Tribe's business
meetings and nearly all of their pow wows (T. 5-6); (3) that
although he is not a member of the Ute Tribe, he is a member of
the Little Shell Tribe of Chippewa Indians, a tribe which is not
recognized by the federal government (T. 7; Def. Ex. 3 & 4 ) ; (4)
that he had received money distributed from a fund administered
by the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA)— a fund that had been
created pursuant to a money judgment won by various bands of the
Pembina Chippewa Indians (T. 6-8; Def. Ex. 2); (5) that he had
received free health care from the Indian Health Services (IHS)
his entire life (T. 10); and (5) that he had 5/16ths Indian blood
(T. 11).
In a brief cross-examination of defendantf the State
established that defendant had no Ute Indian blood; that his
mother, although an Widian, was not an enrolled member of any
tribe; that his father was not an Indian; that he had a
grandmother who was Indian and a grandfather who was half-Indian;
and that he received no benefits in Utah other than the free
health care from IHS

(T. 11-13).

The State presented no

independent evidence.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
If the Utah Supreme Court rules that Myton, Utah is not
within the Uintah Indian Reservation in State v. Perankf Case No.

Defendant qualified this by indicating that he was receiving
money from BIA every year (T. 13).
-3-

860196, defendant's conviction should be affirmed, because there
would be no doubt that the state had criminal jurisdiction over
defendant•
Alternatively, the trial court applied an incorrect
burden of proof and standard of proof in ruling that defendant
was not an Indian for purposes of criminal jurisdiction in state
court.

Therefore, the case should be remanded to the lower court

for determination of that issue under the correct burden and
standard of proof*
INTRODUCTION TO ARGUMENT
In the trial court the State argued as one alternative
that Myton, Utah is not within the exterior boundaries of the
Uintah Indian Reservation (T. 18). In ruling that it had
jurisdiction over defendant, the trial court did not address that
question, basing its decision solely on its determination that
defendant was not an Indian (T. 25). In Ute Indian Tribe v.
State of Utah, 773 F.2d 1087 (10th Cir. 1985), cert, denied, 479
U.S. 994 (1986), the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals held that
Myton was within the exterior boundaries of the reservation.
However, the Utah Supreme Court has that issue pending before it
in State v. Perank, Case No. 860196.

If that court decides that

Myton is not within the reservation, there would be no question
the trial court had criminal jurisdiction over defendant.

See

Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145, 148-49 (1973);
United States v. Torres, 733 F.2d 449, 459 (7th Cir.) (state
court has jurisdiction to punish an Indian who commits a crime
off the reservation and within state territory), cert, denied.
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469 U.S. 864 (1984).

On the other hand, if the Supreme Court

agrees with the Tenth Circuit, the issue of defendant's Indian
status would remain.
Because this issue regarding the boundaries of the
reservation and their relationship to Myton is before the Supreme
Court in Perank, the State will not present any argument on the
issue to this Court.

However, since the decision in Perank has

the potential of mooting the jurisdictional issue, it may be wise
for the Court to wait for that decision before issuing an opinion
in the instant case.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT APPLIED AN INCORRECT BURDEN
OF PROOF AND AN INCORRECT STANDARD OF PROOF
IN RULING THAT DEFENDANT WAS NOT AN INDIAN
AND THEREFORE SUBJECT TO STATE JURISDICTION;
ACCORDINGLY, THE CASE SHOULD BE REMANDED FOR
A DETERMINATION OF THIS FACTUAL QUESTION
UNDER THE CORRECT BURDEN AND STANDARD OF
PROOF.
In ruling that defendant was not an Indian so as to
subject him to the criminal jurisdiction of the state, the trial
court required defendant to demonstrate by clear and convincing
evidence that he was an Indian, in that he was not an enrolled
member of a federally recognized tribe (T. 25-26).

In short, the

court placed the ultimate burden of proof on defendant and
required him to meet a clear and convincing standard of proof.
On appeal, defendant argues that this was reversible error•
Before addressing the issue of what burden and standard
of proof should apply to the Indian status determination, a brief
discussion of criminal jurisdiction in cases involving Indians
-5-

and Indian lands will be helpful in understanding the
significance of that issue.
Criminal jurisdiction over Indian land is controlled by
a complicated scheme of laws that creates jurisdiction in three
competing sovereigns: the federal government, the states, and the
tribes.

See generally Clinton, Criminal Jurisdiction Over Indian

Lands: A Journey Through A Jurisdictional Maze, 18 Ariz. L. Rev.
503 (1976) (hereafter "Clinton").

"Determining which sovereign

or sovereigns have jurisdiction turns on a two-step inquiry: 1)
where the offense took place; and 2) whether the defendant or
victim was Indian or non-Indian."

St. Cloud v. United States,

702 F. Supp. 1456, 1458 (D.S.D. 1988).

In the instant case, the

central question is whether defendant is an Indian, such that the
state court would not have jurisdiction over him for the drug
2
crime he allegedly committed in Indian country.

If defendant is

an Indian, the federal government has exclusive jurisdiction to
prosecute him for the alleged drug offense.
See United States
As noted above, whether Myton, Utah is in Indian country is an
issue currently pending in the Utah Supreme Court. The trial
court necessarily assumed that Myton was in Indian country when
it decided the question of defendant's Indian status. For
purposes of discussion of the Indian status issue, the State will
assume that defendant was in Indian country when he committed his
crime. However, if the Supreme Court in Perank rules that Myton
is not in Indian country, that defendant may be an Indian will be
irrelevant; as previously observed, state jurisdiction would lie
in that situation (i.e., the state has jurisdiction where an
Indian commits a crime off the reservation and in state
territory).
Defendant argues that jurisdiction for his alleged crime is in
either federal court or tribal court. However, in light of Duro
v. Reina, 110 S.'Ct. 2053 (1990), the Ute Tribal Court has no
jurisdiction over him, in that he is not a member of the Ute
Tribe. (continued on next page)
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v. Bluef 722 F.2d 383 (8th Cir. 1983) (federal district court has
jurisdiction over Indian defendant accused of distribution of
marijuana and possession with intent to distribute hashish, in
violation of federal statute); People v. Luna, 683 P.2d 362
(Colo. App. 1984) (state lacked jurisdiction to prosecute Indian
defendants for alleged sale and distribution of controlled
substances in Indian country).

See also State v. St. Francis,

563 A.2d 249, 251 (Vt. 1989) ("If defendants are 'Indians' and
the crimes were committed in 'Indian country,' then Vermont has
no jurisdiction over defendants."); 18 U.S.C. §§ 1151, 1152,
1153, 1162.
With the foregoing principles of jurisdiction as a
backdrop, the specific issue of what burden and standard of proof
apply in establishing Indian status may now be addressed.

In its

brief to the Utah Supreme Court in Perank, the State took the
following position regarding the burden to demonstrate Indian
status:
As the moving party challenging the
court's jurisdiction, Perank carries the
initial burden of producing sufficient
evidence, beyond mere suppositions or
allegations, to establish a jurisdictional
question. Yeazell v. Copins, 98 Ariz. 109,
402 P.2d 541, 546 (1965), and United States
v. Hester, 719 F.2d 1041 (9th Cir. 1983).
Moreover, since the basis of his
jurisdictional challenge is that he is an
Indian, he carries the initial burden of
Cont.
Under federal law, states may assume jurisdiction
over Indian lands with the consent of the Indian tribes. See 25
U.S.C. §§ 1321(a), 1322(a). Although Utah statutory law provides
for the assumption of jurisdiction, Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-36-9
to -21 (1989), no Indian tribe has consented to state
jurisdiction. United States v. Felter, 752 P.2d 1505, 1508 n.7
(10th Cir. 1985).
-7-

producing prima facie evidence to establish
such. United States v. Hesterf supra. Given
the evidence Perank presented, albeit
limited, we cannot say that he failed to meet
his threshold burden of establishing his
status as an Indian and creating a
jurisdictional question on that issue.
Once that threshold showing was made, the
burden shifted, and the State was required to
carry the ultimate burden of persuasion on
jurisdiction. State v. Allen, 607 P.2d 426,
428 (Idaho 1980); Frankel v. Wyllie and
Thornhill, Inc., 537 F. Supp. 730, 735 (N.D.
Va. 1982). Utah Code Annotated, Section 761-501(3) provides that "The existence of
jurisdiction . . . shall be established by a
preponderance of the evidence." While the
State argued that Perank was not an Indian
because he was not an enrolled member of the
Tribe and had not participated in tribal
activities (R. 87-88), unfortunately, no
evidence was presented below by the State
regarding Perankfs Indian status.
Given the state of the record, it cannot
be said that Perank's status as an Indicin
under 18 U.S.C. Sections 1152 and 1153 was
not established.
Brief of Resp. at 48-49 (footnote omitted).

In light of the

position taken there, the State is not free to argue in the
instant case that the trial court's allocation of the ultimate
burden of proof to defendant or its application of the clear and
convincing standard of proof was correct.

Although a number of

courts have adopted a contrary view of which party carries the
ultimate burden of proof, see, e.g., State v. Francis, 563 A.2d
at 253 (the defendant bears the burden of proving Indian status
by a preponderance of the evidence); Jones v. State, 94 Nev. 679,
680, 585 P.2d 1340, 1341 (1978) ("the accused must shoulder the
burden of establishing his Indian ancestry if he seeks to
challenge state court jurisdiction"), the State's position in

-8-

Perank f i n d s c o n s i d e r a b l e - r» iif •) n > i
r u n s i sltrtif

Im
'

i i

I

I !• LJnu p.I u i ii I language ol s e c t i o n

i s s u s c e p t i b l e t o but

one r e a s o n a b l e i r r e r p r ^ t a t i c

b e a r s t h e u l t i m a t e burden
p r e p o i i d e i a 11 i

f OF M*I
I 11 IU „ e v i d e r i c e .4

Accordingly,

state

:

defendant's

i d< tinnnliidl iim

*»•

c a s e s h o u l d be remanded

i I m.

1 he

court

umiei

IIK.' i-i i ci rid d i d cj i L i Liiiatecj ny I.he State? t o t h e Supreme C o u r t
T h a t q u e s t i o n i s one of

a p p r o p r i a t e l y de terra I ni'i! hv i in

indiaii ..tdiiih

1

trial

^n Perank.

fni

/ 6 - I - bO I ( 3 ) t wli I r.h

facl

which

i i MM I MIM I

v. Torres,

,n i , ti a t 457 ( I n d i a n s t a t u s f o r

•question. o.t

f'aci

quebtiuii

r

I F IIH i " I

bee u n i t e d

States

jurisdiction

is a

on which t h e g o v e r n m e n t c a r r i e s t h e b u r d e n i
I'OlN'l 11

DEFENDANT H A S SUGGESTED A N APPROPRIATE TEST
FOR DETERMINING WHETHER A DEFENDANT TS Z\N
INDIAN,
As* L iJiiNii i in | in I in

defendant's

i

(iijii.

" j , endanL sugqpstp

-

ct^ -- -

of •

^UBPTII M

1

'y '
"

i I | i uilibi din i r* I percentage of. Indian blood; and

I ') ij racial and social status as an Indian
II l

i determination

Indian stdtus, tills Court should enunciate the test

for determining that q u e s t i c
two-j'M"»r] t<

I iiiiiii iiiiiijiiji

\l

Appellant at

",|,ho State agieeL that, with some elaboivil M I M
-tp t w e t ,

:->f.ji i J U I I n> i-bti.il ij r e a d s :
Tl i£ • existence of jurisdiction and venue
are not elements of the offense but shall b e
established b y a preponderance >f f;)i
evidence.

-9-

i

"Though there are a variety of statutory definitions of
'Indian', Congress has not defined 'Indian' as used in the
statutes governing criminal jurisdiction."

St. Cloud v. United

States, 702 F. Supp. at 1460 (footnote omitted).
Clinton at 513.

See also

This has required courts to develop a

methodology for resolving Indian status disputes in criminal
cases.

State v. Bonaparte/ 114 Idaho 577, 578-79, 759 P.2d 83,

84-85 (Idaho App. 1988).

A widely accepted methodology is the

following:
Two elements must be satisfied before it can
be found that [a defendant] is an Indian
under federal law. Initially, it must appear
that he has a significant percentage of
Indian blood. Secondly, the [defendant] must
be recognized as an Indian either by the
federal government or by some tribe or
society of Indians.
Goforth v. State, 644 P.2d 114, 116 (Okl. Cr. 1982). Similar
expressions of this two-prong test appear in United States v.
Torres, 733 F.2d at 456; United States v. Broncheau, 597 F.2d
1260, (9th Cir.), cert, denied, 444 U.S. 859 (1979); United
States v. Dodge, 538 F.2d 770, 786 (8th Cir. 1976), cert, denied,
429 U.S. 1099 (1977); State v. Atteberry, 110 Ariz. 354, 519 P.2d
53 (1974); Makah Indian Tribe v. Clallam County, 73 Wash.2d 677,
440 P.2d 442 (1968)5.

Compare Clinton at 513-20 (suggesting that

social recognition be added to tribal or federal recognition).
The Goforth test, with the addition of the social recognition
Some courts have modified the first prong of the test set out
in Goforth to require a showing of "some Indian blood" rather
than "a significant percentage of Indian blood." See, e.g., St.
Cloud, 702 F. Supp. at 1460. However, the latter test, as to
which the parties in the instant case do not disagree, is the
more appropraite test.
-10-
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sufficient proof that a person is an Indian, a person may still
be an Indian though not enrolled in a recognized tribe.
(citing cases).

Ibid,

See also Vialpando, 640 P.2d at 79.

Although the foregoing list of factors is not
exhaustive, it will provide the trial court with some guidance on
remand.
CONCLUSION
If the Utah Supreme Court rules that Myton, Utah is not
within the Uintah Indian Reservation in State v. Perank, this
Court should affirm defendant's conviction on the ground there is
no question the state had jurisdiction.

Alternatively, the Court

should remand the case for a determination of the Indian status
question under a correct allocation of the burden of proof and a
proper standard of proof.
RESPECTFULLY submitted this /O ^ d a y of August,
1990.
R. PAUL VAN DAM
Attorney General

DAVID B. THOMPSON
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Assistant Attorney General
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